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Abstract 
 
Voluntarily switching trading location from the New York Stock Exchange to Nasdaq is a 
relatively new phenomenon, with 53 companies making the switch since 2000. This paper 
examines the stated reasons for the move and investigates their consistency with the 
subsequent market dynamics, including effects on liquidity, trading activity, and visibility. 
We find that while the move to Nasdaq increases trading costs, it improves visibility and 
attracts more liquidity providers in the long term, explaining the subsequent increase in 
trading volume and supporting many of the management statements justifying the move. Our 
findings suggest multi-dimensional aspects may be important considerations in moves 
between exchanges. 
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The first voluntary shift from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to Nasdaq occurred 
with Aeroflex Corporation in 2000; previously, the only moves between exchanges had been 
from Nasdaq to NYSE. Before 2000, firms moved to NYSE ostensibly because NYSE had 
more stringent listing requirements, and because a move to NYSE may be perceived as a 
signal of increasing firm quality. On the other hand, the reasons for a move in the other 
direction to Nasdaq have not been as well understood. There is no clear empirical evidence 
on how liquidity was affected when the first company moved from NYSE to Nasdaq. Kalay 
and Portniaguina (2001) find an abnormal positive return when Aeroflex moved, combined 
with subsequent lower bid-ask spreads and an increase in volume. In contrast, Pruitt, Van 
Ness, and Van Ness (2002) report increases in the bid-ask spread and a reduction in the 
number of trades. The inconclusive findings of these studies on liquidity, measured by 
spreads, may be attributed to the different lengths of the time windows examined, as well as 
different liquidity metrics. However, regardless of the metrics deployed in these first studies, 
the sample size of one firm limits the relevance and applicability of their findings.  
Moving exchanges is costly and many managers may publicly disclose their rationale 
for incurring these costs. Examining press releases, we find that two-thirds of the companies 
moving from NYSE to Nasdaq state that they are moving to reduce trading costs and improve 
liquidity. Other reasons mentioned include an expected increase in trading volume and an 
improvement in corporate visibility. There are a few possible explanations underpinning the 
publicly stated reasons to switch stock listing venues. The first is to take advantage of the 
relatively large size of the moving firms by switching the firm to Nasdaq, which is dominated 
by small companies. This improvement in visibility may help eliminate any difference in 
liquidity across the two stock exchanges and increase trading volume. In addition, Nasdaq is 




perceptions of the company by association. However, it is possible that managers’ stated 
reasons for the move are driven by their overconfidence and hubris (e.g., Malmendier and 
Tate (2005)), which may result in the actual effects of the move being inconsistent with the 
publicly disclosed motivations1. Thus, a question remains as to whether these reasons are 
empirically supported, especially since the trading environment has changed significantly 
since 2000, with high frequency traders accounting for up to 50% of trading as of June 20142.  
  In this paper we delve deeper to understand why firms move from NYSE to Nasdaq. 
Using a 15-year time period (2000–2015) we identify 53 firms that have voluntarily moved 
from NYSE to Nasdaq. We examine trading dynamics and obtain empirical evidence about 
liquidity, trading activity, and visibility differences, allowing us to investigate whether the 
evidence is consistent with firms’ stated reasons for their move to Nasdaq. Closest to our 
work is that of Tse and Devos (2004) and Clyde, Schultz, and Zaman (1997), who examine 
companies that moved from the American Stock Exchange (Amex) to Nasdaq in the earlier 
1992–1995 and 1998–2000 periods. Our work differs from theirs in that we focus on NYSE, 
not Amex firms, and we consider a more recent set of companies that made the switch in a 
time window that includes the periods before, during and after the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). In addition, we use the national best bid and ask quotes prevailing in the second 
prior to the trade to estimate intraday market quality measurements, which offers more 
accurate liquidity estimates than using quotes originating from the NYSE only. Furthermore, 
we examine a much longer time period than in earlier studies to capture long-term effects, 
while also using an event study methodology around the move to measure the short-term 
effects.  
                                                 






We also improve on the methodology employed in earlier research. Tse and Devos 
(2004) and Kalay and Portniaguina (2001) used a simple comparison of the average market 
quality measures before and after stocks moved between exchanges. We estimate the 
pairwise difference in market quality proxies between the firms that moved exchanges and 
individually-matched stocks that did not move. This approach captures any commonality 
effects that are likely to be significant during the high volatility GFC period, which is 
contained in our study’s sample period. Another enhancement in our methodology is the use 
of fixed effect difference-in-differences regressions to control for time variation in the 
matching variables and any effect due to volatility or share price.  
We find that firms incur higher transaction costs after moving from NYSE to Nasdaq. 
This liquidity decline suggests that the move may reduce price competition between liquidity 
providers. Trade volume is not affected in the short-term, but increases significantly in the 
long-term. The lack of a short-term impact on trading volume and a decrease in liquidity is 
consistent with Deuskar and Johnson (2011), who find that volume may have a transient, but 
no permanent association with liquidity. The long-term increase in trading volume along with 
the long-term deterioration in liquidity3 for stocks moving to Nasdaq is also supported by 
Charles et al. (1993), Easley and O'Hara (1992), and Johnson (2008). These studies find 
higher volume is associated with wider bid-ask spreads if increased volume is induced by a 
change in the competition among liquidity traders. We also document significantly higher 
                                                 
3 It seems intuitive that more active stocks are usually more liquid. However, empirical and theoretical evidence 
is not necessarily consistent with this intuition. For example, Feldhütter, Hotchkiss, and Karakaş (2016) find 
that bond volume increases for distressed securities while all four liquidity measures are higher. Evans and 
Lyons (2002) report no link between liquidity and trading volume on the foreign exchange market. A number of 
other studies also show both theoretically and empirically that trading volume is not always positively related to 
liquidity (e.g., see Barinov (2014), Johnson (2008), Charles, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), Foster and 




realized spreads after stocks switch their listing exchange to Nasdaq, indicating less 
competition among liquidity providers for those firms in Nasdaq.  
Collectively, the higher long-term volume documented is possibly because liquidity 
providers of the stocks moving to Nasdaq may enter the market and publicize these stocks. 
An alternative explanation is that the exposure of the stocks listed on Nasdaq is more 
appealing to investors, and therefore trading volume increases as more investors participate. 
This explanation is consistent with one of the stated motivations of the move: to bring higher 
visibility to the company. Our findings on the impact of the move from NYSE to Nasdaq on 
the firms’ media coverage also provide empirical support for this explanation. The moving 
firms enjoy a significant improvement in media tone as well as attract a higher amount of 
press attention after the stock exchange switch. We note, however, that our evidence of a 
decline in liquidity is inconsistent with firms’ publicly disclosed motives for the move. 
However, it is in line with our prediction that managers may be over-optimistic about 
reducing or eliminating liquidity differentials between NYSE and Nasdaq. 
To further test the robustness of our findings, we perform similar analyses for 196 
firms that voluntarily moved from Nasdaq to NYSE during the same time period of 2000–
2015, and their non-moving matches. Overall, the findings for firms switching from Nasdaq 
to NYSE are consistent with those for firms moving in the other direction to Nasdaq. The 
results show that liquidity is lower for firms listed in Nasdaq in both the short-term and the 
long-term. Trading volume is not affected immediately after the move in either direction but 
significantly increases in the long-term when moving to Nasdaq. Our results resolve 
conflicting findings in earlier research regarding the change in transaction costs, as we show 
a consistent deterioration in liquidity when firms move to Nasdaq. Our finding holds even 
when we use a variety of liquidity measures with time windows of different lengths and 




and matching firms. Overall, our findings suggest that multi-dimensional aspects of liquidity 
and trading activity may be important considerations when firms move to Nasdaq.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to provide systematic, large-sample evidence on the impact of the 
stock exchange movement from NYSE to Nasdaq on the most important market quality 
indicators, namely liquidity, trading activity, and visibility. As mentioned above, our analysis 
improves on prior studies by employing an innovative matched pair difference-in-differences 
method to examine a variety of liquidity measures over different time windows. This 
approach allows us to obtain robust results and helps reconcile the conflicting findings on 
liquidity in earlier research. Thus, our study adds to an understanding of the market 
structure’s effect on trading dynamics as well as contributes to the literature on listing 
location. Furthermore, our study is related to recent research on the role of the business press 
in financial markets. We show that an important motive of firms’ exchange listing switch is 
to improve their visibility as reflected by greater media coverage and more positive media 
sentiment. Finally, our research not only adds to the academic literature but also provides 
relevant implications for practitioners, that is, assisting them in their decision-making process 
on stock listing location.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the rationales for the firms’ 
decision to switch to Nasdaq. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of liquidity 
and trading activity proxies with descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the methodology 
while Section 5 reports results on the impact of the stock exchange movement on liquidity, 
trading activity, and the dynamic trading process. Section 6 analyzes the effect of the switch 
from Nasdaq to NYSE on corporate visibility and the impact of the move in the other 





2. Why Did Firms Switch to Nasdaq? 
Nasdaq is often perceived as a technology-centric stock exchange, and that may be 
one reason why technology firms, and those firms wanting to be perceived as technology 
firms, may be attracted to the exchange. However, while the first move to Nasdaq by 
Aeroflex occurred at the height of the internet bubble, subsequent switching did not 
necessarily correspond with enthusiasm about technology. Indeed, all of the 53 companies 
that voluntarily moved from the NYSE to Nasdaq from January 2000 to December 2015 are 
included in our sample but only 10 (18.8%) are classified as technology firms by Nasdaq4,5. 
This suggests that other important reasons for the change in stock exchange listing location 
may be at work.  
To identify those potential reasons, we located news articles about each move 
between exchanges, and Table 1 presents the reported reasons for the change of exchange 
listing. For two-thirds (35) of the sample of 53 companies, managers indicated that an 
improvement in cost efficiencies and liquidity was the reason for their listing move to 
Nasdaq. The advantage of the Nasdaq trading platform was the second most popular reason 
for making the switch. The remaining reasons disclosed by firms included Nasdaq being the 
leading exchange for technology companies, as well as there being higher visibility, and 
increased trading volume on Nasdaq. In our analysis, we focus on examining the first two 
reasons, including liquidity and trading activity. In addition, we also analyze whether firm 
visibility improves following the move to Nasdaq. In the remainder of this section, we first 
discuss whether the stated motives of the exchange listing switch are supported by the 
existing literature. We next analyze the moving firms, especially their size relative to those 
                                                 
4 Source: http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?industry=Technology   
5 Although 59 firms moved voluntarily from NYSE to Nasdaq during this period, six of them are not included in 




listed on NYSE and Nasdaq before then examining possible factors that may justify their 
reasons for the move. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
The expectation of improving liquidity for firms moving to Nasdaq is surprising, as a 
number of studies using pre-2000 data empirically show that trading costs are lower on 
NYSE compared to Nasdaq (see Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Bessembinder (1999), 
and Huang and Stoll (1996)). A widely used explanation for this phenomenon is the presence 
of “preferencing” agreements6, which hinders competition between Nasdaq market makers 
and thus increases transaction costs on this market (e.g., Barclay (1997), Bloomfield and 
O'Hara (1998), Dutta and Madhavan (1997), and Huang and Stoll (1996)). However, the 
earlier literature also shows that the differentials in average transaction costs between NYSE 
and Nasdaq are larger for smaller market capitalization firms compared to large firms 
(Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)). Importantly, Weston (2000) finds that the difference in 
NYSE and Nasdaq average spreads diminished after Nasdaq underwent market reforms7 in 
1997. Since then, the trading environment has altered significantly with the advent of high-
frequency trading (HFT), which may further eradicate the pre-2000 differentials in average 
spreads across these two stock markets. Thus, it is possible that for our sample period post-
                                                 
6 A preferencing agreement refers to the situation where order flow is routed to market makers based on a pre-
negotiated arrangement rather than market makers displaying the best quotes. This may result in a lack of 
competition on the Nasdaq market.  
7 In 1997, Nasdaq introduced the new Order-Handling Rules, the Sixteenths Minimum Increment Rule, and the 
Actual Size Rule. These reforms aimed at reducing transaction costs and promoting competition without having 





2000, any disadvantages of an increase in trading costs on Nasdaq may not be significant, 
especially if the moving firms are relatively large.  
To evaluate the above conjecture, we analyze the relative size of the moving stocks on 
NYSE and Nasdaq. Figure 1 illustrates the mean and median size of the 53 firms moving to 
Nasdaq in comparison with all NYSE-listed and all Nasdaq-listed companies over the 15-year 
period8. For each stock, we calculate the time-series average market capitalization over the 
15-year period before estimating cross-sectional means and medians for each of three 
samples: a sample of 53 firms, a sample of all NYSE-listed stocks, and a sample of all 
Nasdaq-listed stocks. Interestingly, the 53 firms switching from NYSE to Nasdaq have an 
average market capitalization of $8.27 billion, which is higher than the average of all NYSE-
listed stocks ($5.49 billion) and approximately eight times larger than that of all Nasdaq-
listed issues ($1.28 billion). The comparison of median market capitalization across these 
three samples presents the same story. The median value of the moving firms is $3.24 billion, 
larger than the median values of NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed firms. These values indicate 
that the moving firms are not small firms compared to others in NYSE and are also relatively 
large after moving to Nasdaq. Taken together, our analysis suggests that the moving firms are 
likely to become significant members on Nasdaq in terms of market capitalization. Hence, 
consistent with our conjecture, the potential higher transaction costs on this market might be 
minimized or even disappear given that the moves occurred from 2000 onward, after the 
1997 Nasdaq reforms. However, this evidence does not necessarily imply that firms would 
experience lower trading costs and higher liquidity after their switch to Nasdaq. 
 
                                                 
8 Note that the mean market capitalization in Figure 1 is slightly higher than that reported in Tables 2 and 3 
since this figure presents the market value statistics over the 15-year period while the reported values in Tables 




<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE > 
 
In light of prior research and our preliminary analysis above, we contend that there 
are at least two possible factors that may justify the publicly declared reasons for the move to 
Nasdaq. First, the expectation of firm managers’ regarding improved liquidity after moving to 
Nasdaq may reflect managerial overconfidence. Managers may interpret their company’s 
relatively large size as being even more prominent after a move to a smaller exchange such as 
Nasdaq. Managers may believe that they can capitalize on the relative position and improve 
the company’s position even further. A managerial decision to move the firm so that it is 
more important and relatively larger may provide benefits to the managers, but this may not 
necessarily translate to tangible financial benefits despite how the move is justified publicly. 
This type of behavior can loosely be regarded as exhibiting overconfidence, and the literature 
has identified that managerial overconfidence (aka hubris) plays an important role in 
explaining corporate decisions such as investment, mergers and acquisitions and financing 
(see Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier and Tate (2008), and Malmendier, Tate, and 
Yan (2011)). Thus, management behavior may be an important underlying factor explaining 
the change in the stock listing venue, and therefore stated public claims for the exchange 
move should be carefully investigated. 
The second factor relates to other important benefits in moving firms from NYSE to 
Nasdaq, including more active trading activity and improved corporate visibility, as the firms 
are relatively larger firms on Nasdaq compared to their peers remaining on NYSE. 
Specifically, larger stocks tend to be more actively traded than smaller stocks (e.g., see James 
and Edmister (1983) and Lo and Wang (2000)). There are two reasons why visibility may 
improve for firms moving to Nasdaq. First, technology firms are more concentrated on 




Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) identify the ‘dotcom’ effect, where firms with name 
changes to internet-related dotcoms produce abnormal returns simply due to the perception 
that the companies are more technology-focused. With the bulk of technology firms trading 
on Nasdaq, moving to Nasdaq may improve the visibility and perception of the company. 
Second, smaller-sized companies are more typical on Nasdaq, and therefore companies that 
move there face less competition for investor attention, and hence have more visibility. 
 
3. Data and Variable Construction 
In this section we describe the data, the sample selection procedure to identify the 
companies that move exchanges, and the process for matching firms and constructing stock 
liquidity and trading activity measures. Section 3.1 describes the data source and sample 
selection. T-test and Wilcoxon median test results are presented in this section to verify the 
quality of our matching procedure. Section 3.2 constructs various measures of liquidity and 
trading activity and describes descriptive statistics for the moving and matching samples.  
 
3.1 Data sample  
All intraday trades and quotes between 9:30am and 4:00pm are obtained from the 
NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. The data filter process follows Bessembinder 
(1999). The national best bid and ask quotes prevailing the second prior to the trade are used 
to estimate intraday market quality measurements. A panel data analysis method with an 
event study approach is used for the long-term analysis with 120-day windows surrounding 
the moving dates, while a similar approach using different time windows is used for the 
short-term analysis. 
A matched control sample of stocks is selected where the matched stock remained 




stocks to test for the difference in transaction costs is to match firms one-to-one without 
replacement based on market capitalization and stock prices9. In order to select the match, a 
distance metric DD  is estimated as follows: 
,
Ai Aj Ai Aj
Ai
Ai Aj Ai Aj
MarketCap MarketCap P P
DD






AiMarketCap  is the market capitalization of stock i  listed in the exchange A ; AiP  is 
the closing trade price of stock i  listed in the exchange A; and A is the original stock 
exchange of stock i , which is NYSE in this study.  
 Each sample stock i  is matched with a non-movement stock j  that is listed on the 
same exchange A, and has the smallest distance 
AiDD  measure. The distance measure is 
calculated based on market value and stock price at the beginning of the sample period as at 
December 2007, following Davies and Kim (2009) and Beber and Pagano (2013). For each 
moving and matched stock, we obtain all trade and quote information from the NYSE TAQ 
dataset. The market quality estimation dataset is matched with market capitalization data 
obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily dataset. 
Table 2 reports the success of the matching procedure by reporting the mean and 
median of market capitalization and share price for the firms that switched listing exchange 
and their matched stocks that remained on the NYSE. There is no statistical difference 
                                                 
9  There is a conventional belief that matched firms should be in the same industry as the moving firms. 
However, Davies and Kim (2009) find that pre-sorting by industry may reduce test power for differences in 
transaction costs, and that at best, it has little effect. In this study, we implement the analysis using the one-to-
one nearest-neighbor matching, both with and without industry matching in addition to the market value and 
stock price for each stock. We report analysis without restricting firms to the same industry. Nevertheless, the 




between the two samples when examining market capitalization, stock price, and the number 
of shares outstanding.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
3.2 Measures of liquidity and trading activity  
 We use a variety of measures to characterize trading. Effective spreads are used to 
measure transaction costs. These are an illiquidity proxy, where a larger effective spread 
indicates higher execution costs and therefore lower liquidity. Using intraday data we 
calculate round-trip dollar and percentage effective spreads as follows: 
2 ,it it itEffectiveSpread P M= −  
,it it itRelativeEffectiveSpread EffectiveSpread M=   
where for stock i  at time t , itEffectiveSpread  is the dollar effective spread, 
itRelativeEffectiveSpread   is the relative effective spread, itP  is the trade price of stock i at 
time t, and itM  is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade. 
We also decompose effective spreads into two components: realized spreads and the 
permanent price impact of trades. The first component measures revenue earned by the 
liquidity providers for facilitating a trade and is estimated as follows:   
5min2 ,it it itRealizedSpread P M += −  




where for each stock i at time t, 
itRealizedSpread  is the five-minute realized dollar spread, 
itRelativeRealizedSpread  is the relative five-minute realized spread, and 5minitM +  is the 
midquote price prevailing five minutes following the trade. 
The second component of effective spreads, the price impact of trades, measures the 
subsequent price change following a transaction: 
,it it itPriceImpact EffectiveSpread RealizedSpread= −  
,it it itRelativePriceImpact PriceImpact M=   
 
where for stock i at time t, 
itPriceImpact  is the dollar five-minute price impact of trade, and
itRelativePriceImpact  is the relative five-minute price impact.  
We calculate a single observation for each metric for each trading day. For effective 
spreads, realized spreads, and price impact measures, we calculate the trade value-weighted 
average effective spreads, realized spreads, and the price impact of trades on all trades10, 
respectively. Trading activity is measured by daily trading volume for each stock-day             
( DDVol ), which is the total number of shares traded in the day for each stock (e.g., see 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). Intraday volatility ( Volatility ) is calculated 
following Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013), using the proportional intraday range as 
follows: 
( )max min ,it it it itVolatility P P VWAP= −   
                                                 
10 In a robustness check, we also estimate volume-weighted effective spreads, realized spreads, and price impact 







itP , and itVWAP  are the highest trade price, lowest trade price, and the volume-
weighted average trade price of stock i  in day t , respectively. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of sample and matching firms. For each sample 
stock and its matched stock, a daily time-series average of trading activity and market quality 
is calculated over the period of January 2000 – December 2015, then cross-sectional means 
are derived for each proxy for each stock, giving one observation for each firm before and 
one observation after the specific date of the exchange listing move. This procedure ensures 
that no artificial statistical significance is created with a larger number of observations. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE > 
 
Table 3 shows that the firms that moved to Nasdaq have a higher number of trades, 
higher trading volume, higher trading value, and lower standard deviations than their matched 
firms that remained on the NYSE. The minimum and maximum trading volume of the 
moving firms is about 11,000 and 27 million shares, respectively, while the range for these 
variables for the matching stocks is from about 11,000 to 28 million shares. The market 
quality proxies report the opposite comparable level of liquidity, with effective spreads, 
realized spreads, and trade price impacts of much higher magnitudes and larger standard 
deviations for the firms that moved to Nasdaq compared to their matching stocks. These 
broad differences indicate that the liquidity and firm characteristics do vary between the two 
samples of stocks. In order to ensure that endogenous stock characteristics are not driving 






Our main innovation compared to past research is the use of matching stocks. Earlier 
research compared the liquidity of the stocks that moved exchanges using two periods – 
before and after the move – so each stock was matched with itself. Thus, the reported changes 
in liquidity in the earlier literature may be a consequence of macroeconomic events that 
might affect all stocks, and not be related to the exchange listing move. Using a control 
sample of matched stocks, we control for market-wide effects over the period. A pairwise 
difference in each liquidity proxy is constructed by measuring the liquidity proxy of each 
stock that moves listing location less its matched stock on each trading day. A univariate 
analysis is deployed using both a parametric t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test to examine whether there are any changes in means and medians of the pairwise 
differences in the proxies after the exchange listing move.  
Importantly, a multivariate analysis is used with a difference-in-difference approach 
to control for potential determinants of changes in the investigated measures. We follow 
Boehmer et al. (2013) to estimate the following fixed-effect model: 
,it i it it itY D X   = + + +                                               (1) 
where for a matched pair of a moving stock i  in day t , itY  is the liquidity measure for the 
moving firm’s shares less the measure of the same proxy for the matched company’s shares. 
t  is a day-specific effect for day t . itD  is an indicator variable set equal to zero before the 
stock exchange listing move and equal to one after the move for stock i  and its matched 
stock on day t . itX  is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their 
matched stocks for the following control variables: daily volume DDVol , market 




share price VWAP . The daily volume as a control variable will be dropped in the regressions 
when this measure is used as the dependent variable.  
The matched pair difference-in-differences estimation allows us to capture any 
market-wide changes potentially affecting the liquidity measures, which may be attributed to 
the movement between exchanges. Following Boehmer et al. (2013), we use matched pair 
fixed effect panel regressions to eliminate any differences between two stocks in a pair during 
the pre-movement period as well as to control for unobserved firm characteristics that may 
affect liquidity. As a robustness check, we also apply time-fixed effects models and the 
results are qualitatively similar, so we present the estimation results of the matched pair fixed 
effect models in the paper. The control variables are designed to take into account time-
variation in the matching variables and any potential effects due to volatility or stock price 
levels documented in the literature. Using this matched-sample fixed effect methodology with 
control variables removes most of the correlation across observations (see Boehmer et al. 
(2013)). Statistical inference is conducted using the date clustered standard errors, which are 
robust to both heteroscedasticity and within-cluster correlation. 
 
5. Result Analysis 
This section presents the empirical results investigating the impact of stock exchange 
listing movement from NYSE to Nasdaq on liquidity and trading activity of the moving firms 
in relation to their matching firms. Section 5.1 reports the long-term effects while section 5.2 
reports the short-term impacts of the move. Section 5.3 investigates dynamic liquidity and 





5.1 Long-term effects on liquidity and trading activity 
Table 4 reports the changes in means and medians of pairwise differences in daily 
trading volume, effective spreads, realized spreads, and price impact in dollar and basis 
points scaled by daily trade value. The exchange listing move date of each sample stock is 
defined as day 0. The pre-period is from day −60 to day −1. The post-period is from day +1 
to day +60. Difference is the change in means and medians from the pre-period to the post-
period in columns 3 and 7, respectively.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
 The table shows that the average matched pair difference in the relative effective 
spread significantly increases by 12.3 basis points (bps) in the post-period compared to the 
pre-period. The median test confirms a statistically significant increase of 1.32 basis points. 
This finding suggests that the companies that move exchange listing from NYSE to Nasdaq 
incur higher transaction costs after switching. The mean and median differences reflect a 
wide dispersion in effects, suggesting the distribution in effects may be highly skewed with 
some very large increases affecting the mean.  
The mean relative realized spread differential also experiences a statistically 
significant change after the exchange listing move, increasing by 11.2 basis points. The 
median of the pairwise difference in relative realized spreads increases by 1.6 basis points 
and is statistically significant. These findings imply higher revenue for liquidity providers 
after the stock moves to Nasdaq. A significant increase in the pairwise difference in the mean 
trading volume is identified between the two periods in this long-term testing even though the 
median does not significantly change. One explanation is that the control variables are not 




affected by control variables subsequent to the move. We use control variables in the next 
multivariate analysis.  
Overall, the results from our univariate analysis suggest that moving from NYSE to 
Nasdaq reduces the liquidity of the moving companies compared with their matching stocks 
listed in NYSE in the same period, which is reflected by a higher relative effective and 
realized spread, indicating most stocks had a reduction in liquidity11 . Some evidence of 
higher trading volume as a result of the move is documented in the long-term.  
Table 5 reports the results of the difference-in-differences regression of each liquidity 
measure. The matched pair fixed-effect dummy variables are omitted in the table to save 
space. Consistent with the mean results in the univariate analysis reported in Table 4, the 
coefficients on the exchange switch indicator D show that the relative effective spread and 
the realized spread both increase significantly after the stock exchange switch. In particular, 
the stock movement increases the average pairwise differences in transaction costs of the 
moving firms by 11.9 basis points. The liquidity providers of the moving stocks earn 9.41 
basis points more in trading revenue than those of the matching firms. The average pairwise 
differences in dollar effective spread and dollar realized spread also see a statistically 
significant rise of $0.160 and $0.149, respectively, in the post-period. The price impact of 
trades does not show a statistically significant change before and after the listing venue 
movement. Nor is the change in relative measure statistically significant. Taken together, the 
results suggest that there are higher liquidity costs for stocks that move to Nasdaq, leading to 
increased trading profits for the traders that provide liquidity for these stocks, while the price 
impact of trades is not affected by the change.   
                                                 
11 We separately examine moving stocks and matching stocks and confirm that there are significant changes in 
the matching stocks between the periods, requiring this pairwise approach to understand the relative change for 






<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
The last row of Table 5 shows that the change in listing location increases the average 
daily shares traded by 75.5 shares compared to matching stocks over the same period. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the univariate analysis, which suggests that in the long 
term, companies that move to Nasdaq suffer higher trading costs due to lower competition 
between the liquidity providers for these stocks after the move. This expense is a trade-off to 
the higher reported trading volume after the move.  
A word of caution is in order. The higher reported trading volume reported on Nasdaq 
may be related to the well-known Nasdaq volume double-counting first identified in the 
1990s. Double-counting occurs when an intermediary is involved on both sides of a trade, 
such that a transaction between two parties may be recorded twice. On NYSE the specialist 
links both sides of a trade, whereas on Nasdaq two separate dealers handle each side of a 
transaction. This market structure makes it appear as if Nasdaq has a higher amount of 
trading. The proportion of trades handled by NYSE specialists has been declining recently as 
more automated trading on NYSE and elsewhere has become popular. Anderson and Dyl 
(2005) examine firms that switched from Nasdaq to NYSE between 1997 and 2002 and find 
that their median volume dropped by about 37%, which is less than in the earlier periods but 
still indicates that there is a change in the volume level, which they attribute to double-
counting. Even though there may be no economic difference, the reported volume may be 





5.2  Short-term effects on liquidity and trading activity 
We examine the short-term liquidity and trading activity impacts of the listing 
location changes using five-trading-day windows around the date of the exchange listing 
move 12. The moving date of each stock is defined as trading day 0. The pre-period is from 
trading day −5 to trading day −1. Two consecutive five-trading-day windows following the 
moving dates are considered to observe the dynamic changes in liquidity and trading activity 
toward the long-term effect. Post-period 1 is from trading day +1 to trading day +5. Post-
period 2 is from trading day +6 to trading day +10. Table 6 reports the change in means and 
medians of daily trading volume, effective spreads, realized spreads, and price impact in 
dollar and basis points scaled by daily trade value by comparing the moving stocks and the 
control stocks. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
 The difference in the average pairwise differences in relative effective spreads 
between the pre-period and the first post period is 24.6 basis points (Panel A), reducing to a 
difference of 18 basis points between the pre-period and the second post-period (Panel B). 
The increases in the medians from the pre-period to both post periods are also statistically 
significant. The dollar effective spread pairwise differential also demonstrates an increase 
between the per-period and both of the post-periods. The pairwise difference in the relative 
realized spread increases statistically significantly in the first post-period but there is no 
statistical difference between the pre-period and the second post-period. This suggests that 
                                                 
12 We use +/- 5 to +/- 10 trading day windows for the short-run analysis. The results are statistically similar, 




while there may be an initial reaction, there is no statistical difference in this liquidity 
measure after the initial period.  
Generally, the univariate analysis shows that the companies that move to Nasdaq have 
to pay higher transaction costs in the short term and tend to also pay more in the longer term. 
There is evidence of a short-term reduction in competition between liquidity suppliers for the 
stocks that move to Nasdaq initially, although this effect is not statistically significant in the 
subsequent short-term period. The change in listing location does not help these companies to 
increase trading volume in the short term, although no control variables are used in the 
univariate analysis, and regression analysis with a difference-in-differences approach may 
provide additional insight.  
Table 7 reports short term difference-in-differences regression results using a set of 
control variables. Overall, the results are consistent with the univariate analysis. The 
coefficients on the movement dummy 𝐷 are 197.12 and 18.34 for the dollar and relative 
effective spreads, respectively; both are statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
estimates indicate that the effective cost of trading increases when the exchange listing moves 
to Nasdaq. The coefficient on the movement indicator variables in the regression of relative 
realized spreads is 13.19 and is statistically significant, implying that for stocks that move 
exchange listing to Nasdaq there is an increase in the short-term trading profits of liquidity 
suppliers of those stocks. Similarly, there are no short-term effects on trading volume, 
verifying the earlier univariate results.  
 





5.3  Dynamic liquidity and trading activity effects 
The previous sections show that, as stocks move from the NYSE to Nasdaq, there is 
no improvement in trading volume in the short-term but over the long-term there is an 
increase in the number of shares traded. Meanwhile, effective spreads and realized spreads 
increase over both the short-term and long-term after the stock exchange switch. Such 
differences in the short-term and long-term effects on liquidity and trading activity warrant a 
further investigation of the dynamic patterns of those effects.  
 To examine the dynamics of the liquidity and trading effects and also to identify any 
changes in the patterns of those effects over time, we follow the extant literature (e.g., 
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) and Serfling (2016)), and regress various liquidity 
proxies and trading activities on the control variables stated in the regression equation (1) and 
dummy variables indicating the trading subperiod relative to the date of the stock listing 
move. We split the 60-day post-move period into non-overlapping 10-day, 15-day, 20-day, 
and 30-day post-period windows and respectively create six, four, three, and two post-period 
dummy variables. Since the regression results over the different windows show a similar 
pattern, we only report the estimations and the graphical analysis of the 10-day post-period 
windows 13 . We implement a matched pair fixed-effect multivariate analysis with a 
difference-in-differences approach to control for the determinants of changes in the 
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where for a matched pair of a moving stock i  in day t , itY  is the liquidity or trading volume 
measure for the moving firm’s shares less the measure of the same proxy for the matched 
                                                 





i  is the matched pair specific effect for day t . n is the number of distinct, 
non-overlapping 10-day, 15-day, 20-day, and 30-day post-period windows; by definition, n 
equals six, four, three, and two, respectively. For the 10-day post-period window, the first 
post-period variable 1
itPostperiod  is set to 1 for the +1 to +10 trading days after the event day 
when firm i  moved, and equal to zero otherwise for stock i  and its matched stock. itX  is a 
set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched stocks for the 
following control variables: daily volume ( DDVol ), market capitalization ( MarketCap ), 
price volatility (Volatility ), and daily volume-weighted average share price (VWAP ). The 
daily volume as a control variable will be dropped in the regressions when this measure is 
used as the dependent variable.  
The regression results using six 10-day post-period windows are reported in Panel A 
of Table 814. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. These statistics are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. We also perform t-tests 
to examine whether the differences in the estimated coefficients on the post-period window 
pair for each liquidity and trading activity proxy are statistically significant. Panel B, Table 8 
reports the t-test results of differences in the estimated coefficients between post-period 
window 1 and the subsequent post-period windows, which reflect the dynamic changes in 
these market quality measures. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE> 
 
Panel A of Table 8 shows that there is no immediate change in trading volume when 
the stocks move to Nasdaq, but after the first 10-day post-period window, the change in each 
                                                 




of the next five post-period windows is statistically significant. Specifically, trading volume 
increases quite significantly in post-period 2, as shown by the relatively large coefficient on 
post-period 2. The coefficients for post-periods 3, 4, 5, and 6 are also significant and higher 
than that for post-period 1 but are not significantly different from that for post-period 215. 
Looking at the effective spreads and realized spreads, the change in these measures is 
significant and highest in magnitude in the first post-period, immediately after the stock 
exchange movement, and becomes smaller in the subsequent post-periods. These results 
show that there are no statistically significant changes in the liquidity measures from post-
period 2 to the subsequent post-periods. While liquidity deteriorates immediately after the 
stock switch, it seems to improve after trading day +20 (i.e., post-period 2). This pattern is 
consistent with the dynamics of trading volume, which experiences no significant change 
immediately after the movement but sees an improvement afterwards, especially between +10 
and +20 days. 
Figures 2 and 3 present graphical analysis of the effects of the stock exchange switch 
on trading volume and liquidity, respectively. The y-axis plots the estimated coefficient on 
the indicator capturing the effect for the post-period of interest in the regression of relevant 
trading volume or liquidity proxies. The x-axis shows the time relative to the stock exchange 
movement for +10 trading day increments, i.e., the different post-period windows. The 
dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates; these 
confidence intervals are estimated from standard errors clustered by date. Figure 2 confirms 
the multivariate analysis and shows that the increase in trading volume is largest between 
trading days +10 and +20, before levelling off between days +20 and +40 and slightly 
decreasing after trading day +60. Figure 3 reveals that both the relative effective spreads and 
                                                 
15 The results of the t-tests examining the differences between post-period 2 and subsequent post-periods are 




relative realized spreads experience an increase in the post-move period16. However, the 
magnitude of this increase is largest between the moving day and trading day +10, becomes 
smaller between trading days +10 and +50, and increases strongly again after trading day 
+50. 
 
6. Additional Analysis 
This section analyzes the effects of stock exchange listing movement from NYSE to 
Nasdaq on the visibility of the moving firms in relation to their matching firms. Section 6.1 
describes the media coverage sample, explains how visibility proxies are constructed, and 
reports the empirical results investigating visibility measures. Section 6.2 reports the dynamic 
liquidity and trading activity changes for firms moving in the other direction from Nasdaq to 
NYSE during the same period to provide a robustness check for the findings in Section 5.  
 
6.1 Effects on stock visibility 
6.1.1 Media coverage sample and variable construction  
Since firm visibility was stated as a motive for a firm to move from the NYSE to 
Nasdaq, we next examine the amount of media coverage that the firm receives before and 
after the move. We obtain data on the news coverage of the moving stock and matched stocks 
during the period from 60 days before to 60 days after the stock switch. News data are from 
RavenPack News Analytics, a leading global news database used in quantitative and 
algorithmic trading, which has recently been used in finance research (e.g., Dai, Parwada, and 
Zhang (2015), Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang (2015), and Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg 
                                                 
16 Since our sample includes a wide range of stocks, the relative measures of spreads are more accurate than the 
absolute measures due to their comparability between stocks. Thus, we present the graphs for the two relative, 




(2013)). We match the CRSP data with RavenPack data using CUSIP, NCUSIP, and 
TICKER over the period January 2000 to December 2016.  
We use the event sentiment score (ESS) and the number of articles estimated by 
RavenPack News Analytics as proxies for media tone and media intensity, respectively. The 
former score, ESS, indicates the firm-specific news sentiment for each firm on a daily basis 
as a numerical score between 0 and 100 rated by experts with extensive experience and 
backgrounds in finance, economics, and linguistics. An ESS score of 50 indicates neutral 
sentiment while a score above 50 indicates positive sentiment and an ESS score below 50 
suggests negative sentiment. RavenPack also calculates a ‘relevance’ score with a range 
value between 0 and 100, which indicates how related the firm is to the underlying news 
story. A higher value of the relevance score indicates greater relevance. Following the 
literature, our sample includes only news with a relevance score of 100, which means the 
firm was prominent in the news story (e.g., see Dai et al. (2015) and Dang et al. (2015)). We 
obtain the data for both the moving and matching firms to estimate visibility proxies. 
Following the literature, we construct two measures of media coverage, media breath 
and media tone, as follows: 










where Narticlesit is the number of articles published about firm i in day t. MediaBreath is an 
indicator of media intensity. A higher value of MediaBreath implies that the firm attracted 
more media attention. MediaTone is the scaled ESS value ranging between −1 and 1, with 
negative, positive and zero values indicating negative, positive and neutral tone (sentiment) 




to Nasdaq over the period between 60 days before and 60 days after the move. We also 
calculate these media measures for the matched firms over the same time windows.  
 
6.1.2 Empirical tests and results  
To conduct our tests about firm visibility, we run a difference-in-differences 
regression in which the dependent variable is the differential of each media coverage measure 
(i.e., MediaTone or MediaBreath) between the moving firms and the matching firms. The 
independent variables are dummy variables indicating the days relative to the moving date 
from the NYSE to Nasdaq. We create indicators for subperiods up to 60 days after the 
exchange switch. For example, Post-period 1 is a dummy variable set to one for the 
subperiod between +1 to +10 days after the moving date. Post-period 6 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for the subperiod between +50 to +60 days after the switching date. Since our test 
window consists of 60 days around the moving date, there are six dummy variables for the 
post-periods.  
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where itY  is the difference between the media coverage proxy of the moving firm and that of 
the matching firm for each matched pair of moving stock i on day t. We also perform a series 
of t-tests to examine whether the differences in the estimated coefficients on the post-period 
dummies are statistically significant. Table 9 reports the regression estimations (Panel A) and 
the t-test results (Panel B) for the two media coverage proxies. The t-statistics are calculated 
from robust standard errors clustered by date. A positive coefficient estimate represents an 
improvement in media sentiment or intensity that will attract investors to those stocks and 





<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
 
Panel A shows that for MediaTone, the coefficients on most of the post-period 
dummies are significantly positive, indicating that, after the stock exchange switch, the 
media’s sentiment on the moving firms improves in comparison to the matching firms. 
Specifically, the moving firms experience the largest improvement in media sentiment 
immediately after the move, as shown by the significant coefficient on Post-period 1.  The 
coefficients on post-periods 3 and 6 are smaller than that on the first post-period but remain 
significantly positive. These results suggest that media sentiment became more positive for 
the moving firms after they moved to Nasdaq with the largest improvement immediately after 
the switch. In the regression of MediaBreath, the coefficient on post-period 6 is statistically 
significant and positive while the coefficients on previous post-periods are not significant. 
This pattern suggests that firms moving to Nasdaq only attract more media attention than 
their matched firms in NYSE in the medium to long term.  
Panel B presents the t-test results regarding the differences between the coefficients 
on the first post-period indicator and those on the subsequent post-period indicators in the 
regressions of MediaTone and MediaBreath. In terms of MediaTone, the differences between 
the coefficients on the dummy variable for post-period 1 and those for the three subsequent 
post-periods are positive (0.0107, 0.0083 and 0.01, respectively) and statistically significant. 
This pattern is consistent with the results reported in Panel A, suggesting the media sentiment 
score of the moving firms significantly increases after the move to Nasdaq, with the highest 
improvement observed in post-period 1. However, in terms of media intensity, there is no 





Overall, these results suggest that there is a significant improvement in the tone of the 
media coverage of a moving stock relative to the matching stocks once the company has 
moved to Nasdaq. The moving firms also seem to attract a higher amount of press attention 
than the matching firms, although the impact is only observed in the medium to long term 
after the move. Taken together, the increase in the sentiment and intensity of firm-specific 
news articles following the stock exchange switches demonstrate an improvement in the 
stocks’ visibility, consistent with our prediction and managers’ stated explanations for the 
move.  
 
6.2 Effects of moving in the opposite direction from Nasdaq to NYSE 
As a robustness check for our main findings regarding the impacts on liquidity and 
trading activities, we examine firms that voluntarily moved in the opposite direction from 
Nasdaq to NYSE in the same time period of 2000–2015. To the extent that firms moving to 
Nasdaq experience lower liquidity and higher trading volume, we expect firms moving in the 
opposite direction to experience higher liquidity and lower trading volume. 
Using the CRSP daily database, we identify 196 firms17 switching from being listed 
on Nasdaq to being listed on NYSE during the sample period. To examine how liquidity and 
trading activity of these firms change after the stock exchange switch, we apply the same data 
filtering process, matching procedure and methodologies as described earlier in Sections 3 
and 4 for firms switching from Nasdaq to NYSE. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the 
quality of the matching procedure for companies moving from Nasdaq to NYSE and their 
matches. In Table A.2 in the Appendix, we present the summary statistics of firms switching 
in this direction and the matching firms over the period of 2000–2015. Interestingly, the 
                                                 
17 There were 235 firms moving from Nasdaq to NYSE during the period of 2000–2015. However, the final 




average market capitalization of firms voluntarily moving from Nasdaq to NYSE is $2.6 
billion, which is much smaller than the figure for firms moving in the opposite direction ($6.8 
billion, as presented in Table 3). This observation is different from the perception that firms 
that move from Nasdaq to NYSE are normally large while those switching their listing from 
NYSE to Nasdaq are likely to be small in terms of market value. 
We estimate the difference-in-differences model (1) using the matched pair fixed-
effect approach. This method allows us to investigate whether various liquidity measures and 
trading volume change after the stock listing switch while controlling for other determinants 
of liquidity and trading volume18. The regression results for the long-term and short-term 
analysis are presented in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 10 HERE> 
 
In Table 10, the movement variable indicators are negative and statistically significant 
in all effective spread and realized spread regressions, indicating lower transaction costs and 
greater competition between liquidity providers for stocks switching their listing from 
Nasdaq to NYSE compared to their matches remaining listed in Nasdaq. The price impacts 
for the moving stocks are significantly higher on NYSE after the move, which is a trade-off 
against a larger reduction in realized spreads than effective spreads in the long-term. Stocks 
moving to NYSE experience a significant reduction in trading volume. One reason for the 
                                                 
18 We also carry out univariate analyses using both parametric t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests for all liquidity proxies and trading volume. The 120-day windows surrounding the movement date are 
employed to measure the long-term effect. A +/- 5 and +/- 10 trading day windows are used to examine the 





decline in trading activity may be that the stocks moving their listing to NYSE are relatively 
small compared to the large stocks already listed on the exchange.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 11 HERE> 
 
In terms of the short-term effect of moving exchanges, we find a similar impact on 
various measures of liquidity for stocks moving from Nasdaq to NYSE, which is shown by 
negative and significant coefficients on the movement dummy variables in Table 11.  
However, there is no evidence of a significant change in trading volume in the short-term for 
firms moving from Nasdaq to NYSE.  
Overall, these results show that firms moving from Nasdaq to NYSE enjoy significant 
improvements in liquidity in both the long-term and the short-term. On the other hand, there 
is a reduction in trading volume in the long-term, although this change is not observable in 
the short-term. These results for firms moving in the opposite direction to the focus of our 
study are consistent with our earlier findings that liquidity deteriorates for firms moving from 
NYSE to Nasdaq, even though reported trading volume and company visibility increase for 
these firms.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We document changes in trading dynamics when firms move from NYSE to Nasdaq. 
There is an initial and sustained decrease in liquidity as measured by the effective and 
realized spreads and price impact. However, the liquidity decline is offset in the long term 
with an increase in reported trading volume and an improvement in media sentiment and 




There are two potential explanations for the long-term increase in trading volume. 
First, the wider spreads are attractive to liquidity providers that would step in and facilitate 
increased trading. Perhaps, short-term trading costs are irrelevant for long-term investors and 
the move to a higher cost market may actually remove more volatile traders while 
encouraging liquidity providers to enter the market. A second, non-mutually exclusive, 
explanation centers around the increased visibility of stocks on Nasdaq. The concentration of 
technology stocks on Nasdaq suggesting moving a stock to Nasdaq may bring attention to the 
stocks by tech investors. This increase in visibility may be due to the share trading being in 
the same ‘habitat’ as related stocks. Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) suggest that once 
stocks are perceived to be in the same habitat, they are more likely to exhibit comovement. 
The move to Nasdaq may contribute to these stocks generating more interest from technology 
investors. Visibility may also increase because these stocks that move to Nasdaq are larger 
relative to other firms on the new exchange after the exchange switch, hence attracting more 
media attention in a market of mainly small firms like Nasdaq.  
While the increase in trading volume and the improvement in corporate visibility in 
practice is consistent with the motivations of the move to Nasdaq that are declared in the 
public announcement of the movement, the deterioration in liquidity on Nasdaq, in reality, 
contradicts the firm’s publicly disclosed objective. These results are robust even when we 
examine liquidity changes for a set of 196 stocks that moved in the opposite direction (from 
Nasdaq to NYSE) over the same time period. Perhaps, the market reforms on Nasdaq in 1997 
and the different trading environment after 2000 may have played a role in forming the 
managers’ expectation of an improvement in liquidity following the listing move to Nasdaq. 
Since the average market capitalization of companies moving to Nasdaq is larger than that of 




managers might be overly optimistic that they would be able to improve the company’s 
position by being a large firm on an exchange dominated by small firms. 
In summary, understanding the complex market quality measures suggests that CEOs 
are focused on long-term trading activity and corporate visibility when they undertake to 
change their company’s trading venue. This long-term benefit is consistent with CEOs' 
explanations for the move, and helps justify the costs incurred. However, the lower liquidity 
documented after the move to Nasdaq seems inconsistent with firms’ publicly disclosed 
motives, and suggests that management’s expectation and behavior may also play a role in 
determining the stock exchange movement.  
Overall, our study reconciles the earlier conflicting findings in liquidity changes with 
our larger sample size of stocks that moved from NYSE to Nasdaq over a recent 15-year 
period. We provide evidence about the impact of the decision to move trading venues by 
empirically documenting some key aspects of stock listings including liquidity, trading 
activity, and corporate visibility. This study will assist managers in understanding that an 
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Table 1. Self-reported reasons listed companies moved to Nasdaq  
 
This table reports the reasons given for the movement of exchange listing location for 53 companies that moved from the NYSE to Nasdaq in the period 2000–2015. The 
source of information is press releases and news reports on announcements made by the companies around the time of the change. Note that some companies provided 
multiple reasons. 
 
  Number of firms Percentage of sample 
Greater cost efficiency, liquidity 35 66.04 
Advantages of NASDAQ trading platform 16 30.19 
Increased visibility 11 20.75 
NASDAQ being the leading exchange for technology companies 10 18.87 
NASDAQ being indicative of the innovation 7 13.21 
Increased trading volume 1 1.89 









Table 2. Matching statistics for the firms moving from NYSE to Nasdaq and their matches 
 
The table presents a comparison of the 53 firms moving from NYSE to Nasdaq with 53 matched firms during the period of January 2000 – December 2015 using without-
replacement matching methods. Matches must be on the same listing exchange as the moving firms before the movement. A distance metric is calculated as the sum of 
absolute percentage deviation between the non-moving matched candidate and the moving stock in market capitalization and price as of the beginning of the investigated 
period. The match is the closest non-moving match candidate to the moving stock in terms of the distance metric. We report the mean and median for the moving and 
matched firms, and provide p-values for the differences between moving and matched firms.  
 
 Means Statistics Medians Statistics 
 Match Moving Difference t 
p-value 
(t-test) Match Moving Difference z 
p-value 
(Wilcoxon) 
Market Capitalization ($ thousands) 6,732,772 6,658,153 -74,619 -0.03 0.97 2,384,877 2,580,167 195,290 0 1 
Stock Price 16.82 16.86 0.04 0.02 0.99 12.96 12.58 -0.38 -0.02 0.98 





Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the moving companies and their matches over the period of January 2000–December 2015 
The table reports the summary statistics for the firms switching the listing exchange during the period of January 2000–December 2015 and their matched stocks. For each 
stock, we calculate the time-series average over the investigated period and estimate cross-sectional means for each proxy. Values are provided in US dollar amounts ($) or in 
basis points (bp). 
 
 Firms NYSE to Nasdaq Matching Firms on NYSE 
Variables #Firms Min Max Mean Std #Firms Min Max Mean Std 
Number of trades 53 26 14,982 3,314 3,169.6 53 25 10,844 3,221 2,850.9 
Daily Trading Volume (shares) 53 11,266 26,933,126 3,900,406 5,263,775 53 11,603 28,355,949 3,472,162 4,991,333 
Daily Trading Value ($ million) 53 0.07 424.2 58.4 80.8 53 0.05 539.5 59.5 94.5 
Effective Spread ($) 53 77.9 3,624.3 381.1 668.5 53 84.1 910.5 187.5 167.1 
Relative Effective Spread (bp) 53 3.1 203.4 30 42.1 53 3 193 23.2 37.4 
Realized Spread ($) 53 152 5,494.1 794.8 848 53 111.9 2034.1 632.5 429.3 
Relative Realized Spread (bp) 53 13.4 207.8 54.5 41.3 53 11.2 243.9 50.2 42.3 
Price Impact ($) 53 -1,841.8 -21.5 -432.4 382.1 53 -1,868.8 79.4 -450.2 434 
Relative Price Impact (bp) 53 -74.2 -1.6 -26.4 16.9 53 -99.4 14.3 -27.8 20.5 
Average Price 53 2.8 49.2 17.7 12.6 53 1.1 54.7 17.3 13.2 
Relative Range-Based Volatility 53 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02 53 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.02 






Table 4. Univariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads components and trading volume: long-term effect 
This table presents the changes in mean and median of daily trading volume, effective spreads, realized spreads and price impact in dollar and basis points scaled by daily 
trade value. The reported means and medians are the differences in spreads components and trading volume between moving stocks and their matching stocks. The moving 
date of each moving stock is defined as day 0. The pre-period is from trading day −60 to trading day −1. The post-period is from trading day +1 to +60. Difference is the 
change in means and medians from the pre-period to the post-period in columns 3 and 7, respectively. The t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests examine whether these 
differences in the means and medians, respectively, are equal to zero.  
 
 Means Medians 
Variables pre-period post-period Difference t-Statistics pre-period post-period Difference Wilcoxon 
Daily Trading Volume (shares) 1,108.7 855,543.5 854,434.8 2.31* -17,550 23,091.5 40,641.5 104.50 
Effective Spread ($1/10000) 115.2 265 149.8 2.28* 1.3 24.9 23.6 549.50*** 
Relative Effective Spread (bsp) 0.4 12.7 12.3 2.28* -0.02 1.3 1.32 534.50*** 
Realized Spread ($1/10000) 84.7 231.6 146.9 2.28* 6.4 10.9 4.5 266.50* 
Relative Realized Spread (bsp) -1.6 9.6 11.2 2.02* 0.3 1.9 1.6 266.50* 
Price Impact ($1/10000) 27.9 9.4 -18.5 -0.73 10.6 35.9 25.3 -83.50 
Relative Price Impact (bsp) 1.8 1.2 -0.6 -0.34 1.7 3.1 1.4 8.50 
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  






Table 5. Multivariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads, price impact and trading 
volume for the moving and matching companies: long-term effects 
The table reports the results of the regression of the following fixed effect model: 
 
,
it i it it it
Y D X   = + + +                                                   (1) 
 
where is various market quality proxies and trading activity for the moving firm less the measured quantity 
of the same proxy for its matched company. 𝛼𝑖 is a matched pair fixed effect for matched pair stock i.  is an 
indicator variable set equal to zero before the movement and equal to one after movement for stock and its 
matched stock on day .  is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched 
stocks for the following control variables: daily volume ( DDVol ), market capitalization ( MarketCap ), price 
volatility ( Volatility ), and the daily volume-weighted average share price ( VWAP ). Dependent variables 
include the dollar effective spread, relative effective spread, dollar realized spread, relative realized spread, price 
impact of trades, relative price impact of trades and daily trading volume. The date of the move from NYSE to 
Nasdaq is categorized as trading day 0. The pre-period is from trading day −60 to trading day −1. The post-
period is from trading day +1 to trading day +60. All of these components of spreads are scaled by trade value. 
The absolute measure of spreads and price impact are multiplied by 104  for presentation purposes. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables D DDVol VWAP Volatility MarketCap 
Adj R-
Square 
Dollar Effective Spread 160.10*** -0.05*** 64.18*** 4,468.18*** -0.29*** 0.30 
 (6.03) (-5.1) (4.44) (5.98) (-3.8)  
Relative Effective Spread 11.91*** -0.01*** -0.18 426.14*** -0.00 0.25 
 (7.52) (-5.5) (-.41) (5.50) (-.26)  
Dollar Realized Spread 148.67*** 0.01 115.66*** 10,343.16*** -0.44*** 0.45 
 (5.50) (0.69) (8.11) (10.3) (-5.9)  
Relative Realized Spread 9.41*** -0.00 0.50 1,039.96*** -0.00 0.38 
 (5.97) (-1.0) (1.15) (11.7) (-1.8)  
Price Impact -9.61 -0.06*** -49.93*** -5,960.54*** 0.14*** 0.52 
 (-.87) (-4.7) ( -10) (-9.0) (5.50)  
Relative Price Impact 0.86 -0.00*** -0.65** -622.64*** 0.00** 0.38 
 (0.99) (-3.6) (-2.7) ( -13) (2.63)  
Daily Trading Volume 75.45***  -6.94*** 3,405.61*** 0.06 0.50 
 (7.06)  (-6.6) (9.17) (1.80)  
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  








Table 6. Univariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads components and trading volume: short-term effects 
 
This table presents the changes in means and medians of daily trading volume, effective spreads, realized spreads and price impact in dollar and basis points scaled by daily 
trade value. The reported means and medians are the differences in spreads components and trading volume between moving stocks and their matching stocks. The moving 
date of each moving stock is defined as trading day 0. The pre-period is from trading day −5 to −1. Post-period 1 is from trading day +1 to + 5. Post-period 2 is from trading 
day + 6 to + 10. Difference is the change in means and medians from the pre-period to Post-period 1 and Post-period 2, and is reported in Panel A and B, respectively. The t-
tests and Wilcoxon signed rank tests examine whether these differences in the means and medians, respectively, are equal to zero.  
 
 Means Medians 
Variables pre-period post-period Difference t-Statistics pre-period post-period Difference Wilcoxon 
Panel A: pre-period vs post-period 1         
Daily Trading Volume (shares) 208,624 411,212.4 202,588.4 0.66 -17,800 -16,014 1,786 27.50 
Effective Spread ($1/10000) 136.7 380.4 243.7 3.10** -3 24.5 27.5 517.50*** 
Relative Effective Spread (bsp) -1.4 23.2 24.6 2.94** -0.28 2.1 2.38 542.50*** 
Realized Spread ($1/10000) 192.1 333.9 141.8 1.55 -17.2 49.6 66.8 214.50 
Relative Realized Spread (bsp) -1.3 23.1 24.4 2.23* -2.2 5.4 7.6 292.50** 
Price Impact ($1/10000) -53.7 24.3 78.1 0.82 17.6 9.3 -8.4 53.50 
Relative Price Impact (bsp) -0.04 -1.3 -1.26 -0.30 2.1 -0.372 -2.505 13.50 





 Means Medians 
Variables pre-period post-period Difference t-Statistics pre-period post-period Difference Wilcoxon 
Panel B: pre-period vs post-period 2         
Daily Trading Volume (shares) 20,8624 488,626.8 280,002.8 0.72 -17,800 -33,416 -15,616 -18.50 
Effective Spread ($1/10000) 136.7 388.3 251.6 2.68** -3 26.1 29.1 472.50*** 
Relative Effective Spread (bsp) -1.4 16.6 18 2.76** -0.28 1.6 1.88 390.50*** 
Realized Spread ($1/10000) 192.1 374.1 182 2.51* -17.2 3 20.2 65.50 
Relative Realized Spread (bsp) -1.3 11.3 12.6 1.67 -2.2 1.3 3.5 104.50 
Price Impact ($1/10000) -53.7 -19.9 33.8 0.72 17.6 22.9 5.3 85.50 
Relative Price Impact (bsp) -0.04 4.1 4.161 0.75 2.1 2.5 0.4 82.50 
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  




Table 7. Multivariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads, price impact and trading 
volume for the moving and matched companies: short-term effects  
The table reports the results of the regression of the following fixed-effect model: 
 
,
it i it it it
Y D X   = + + +                                                      (1) 
 
where is various market quality proxies and trading activity for the moving firm less the measured quantity 
of the same proxy for its matched company. 𝛼𝑖 is a matched pair fixed effect for matched pair stock i.  is an 
indicator variable set equal to zero before the movement and equal to one after movement for stock and its 
matched stock on day . is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched 
stocks for the following control variables: daily volume ( DDVol ), market capitalization ( MarketCap ), price 
volatility ( Volatility ), and the daily volume-weighted average share price ( VWAP ). Dependent variables 
include the dollar effective spread, relative effective spread, dollar realized spread, relative realized spread, price 
impact of trades, relative price impact of trades and daily trading volume. The date of the move from NYSE to 
Nasdaq is categorized as trading day 0. The sample period is from trading day −5 to +10. All of these 
components of spreads are scaled by trade value. The absolute measure of spreads and price impact are 
multiplied by 104 for presentation purposes. The t - statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables D DDVol VWAP Volatility MarketCap 
Adj R-
Square 
Dollar Effective Spread 197.12*** -0.11* -69.41 4855.35** 0.22 0.55 
 (5.31) (-2.3) (-.81) (2.59) (1.00)  
Relative Effective Spread 18.34*** -0.01** -3.03 502.64*** 0.00 0.45 
 (5.99) (-2.8) (-1.2) (3.53) (0.62)  
Dollar Realized Spread 96.47 -0.04 -38.35 13,915.38*** 0.13 0.71 
 (1.92) (-.70) (-.43) (4.25) (0.55)  
Relative Realized Spread 13.19*** -0.01 -2.59 1,307.30*** 0.00 0.59 
 (3.93) (-1.8) (-.83) (7.68) (0.03)  
Price Impact 83.62* -0.05 -7.06 -9,230.57** 0.02 0.58 
 (2.25) (-.77) (-.11) (-3.1) (0.15)  
Relative Price Impact 3.97 -0.00 -0.27 -821.93*** 0.00 0.53 
 (1.66) (-.28) (-.11) (-5.8) (0.52)  
Daily Trading Volume 9.78  -15.64* 1,559.92*** 0.08 0.72 
 (0.38)  (-2.5) (4.00) (1.37)  
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  








Table 8. The dynamics of the liquidity and trading activity effects for stocks moving from NYSE to Nasdaq 
The table reports how the stock exchange movement affects the dynamics of liquidity and trading activity. Panel 
A presents the regression results of the following matched pair fixed-effect model: 
6
1
,jit i j it it it
j
Y postperiod X   
=
= + + +                                            (2) 
where for a matched pair of a moving stock i  in day t , itY  is the liquidity or trading volume measure for the 
moving firm’s shares less the measure of the same proxy for the matched company’s shares. 
i  is a matched 
pair-specific effect for stock pair i. We split the 60-day post-period into distinct, non-overlapping, 10-day, 15-
day, 20-day and 30-day post-period windows, and respectively create six, four, three and two post-period 
dummy variables. For example, for the first 10-day post-period window, the first post-period variable 
1
itPostperiod  is set to 1 for +1 to +10 trading days after the firm i moves, and equal to zero otherwise for 
stock i and its matched stock. Dependent variables include the dollar effective spread, relative effective spread, 
dollar realized spread, relative realized spread, price impact of trades, relative price impact of trades and daily 
trading volume. is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched stocks for the 
control variables, which are defined in Table 7. Panel B includes the t-test results regarding the differences 
between the estimated coefficients for Post-period 1 and those for subsequent post-periods. The absolute 
measure of spreads and price impact are multiplied by 104  for presentation purposes. The t - statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 


















Dollar Effective Spread 265.08*** 126.93*** 126.00*** 135.54*** 82.37*** 222.03 Yes 0.30 
 (5.17) (7.21) (5.58) (5.46) (4.35) (1.87) Yes  
Relative Effective Spread 17.57*** 10.43*** 13.22*** 11.49*** 6.12** 12.46*** Yes 0.25 
 (6.03) (4.67) (5.12) (3.96) (2.84) (3.42) Yes  
Dollar Realized Spread 244.90*** 132.75*** 82.28** 123.98*** 80.16** 225.78* Yes 0.46 
 (4.57) (5.51) (3.12) (4.44) (2.90) (1.96) Yes  
Relative Realized Spread 13.74*** 7.46*** 9.77*** 7.52*** 5.58** 12.25*** Yes 0.38 
 (4.22) (3.45) (3.68) (3.44) (2.74) (3.45) Yes  
Price Impact -4.76 -20.81 20.16 -14.80 -18.16 -19.74 Yes 0.52 
 (-.18) (-1.2) (1.01) (-.70) (-.84) (-1.0) Yes  
Relative Price Impact 2.79 1.92 1.14 0.50 -0.79 -0.47 Yes 0.38 
 (1.49) (1.28) (0.63) (0.31) (-.61) (-.29) Yes  
Daily Trading Volume 25.35 95.33*** 93.79*** 98.75*** 69.06*** 70.63*** Yes 0.50 
 (1.44) (4.74) (3.32) (5.03) (3.37) (4.15) Yes  






Panel B: Pairwise comparison of post-period dummy coefficients for liquidity and trading activities  
Dependent Variable 
Post-period 1 – 
Post-period 2 
Post-period 1 – 
Post-period 3 
Post-period 1 – 
Post-period 4 
Post-period 1 – 
Post-period 5 
Post-period 1 – 
Post-period 6 
Dollar Effective Spread 138.16** 139.09** 129.54* 182.72*** 43.05 
 (2.69) (2.60) (2.38) (3.42) (0.34) 
Relative Effective Spread 7.14* 4.35 6.08 11.45*** 5.11 
 (2.23) (1.25) (1.62) (3.59) (1.20) 
Dollar Realized Spread 112.15* 162.62** 120.92* 164.74** 19.12 
 (2.01) (2.85) (2.09) (2.79) (0.15) 
Relative Realized Spread 6.28 3.97 6.22 8.16* 1.48 
 (1.82) (1.04) (1.77) (2.36) (0.33) 
Price Impact 16.06 -24.92 10.04 13.40 14.98 
 (0.52) (-.79) (0.31) (0.40) (0.47) 
Relative Price Impact 0.88 1.66 2.29 3.58 3.26 
 (0.39) (0.66) (0.98) (1.68) (1.40) 
Daily Trading Volume -69.98** -68.44* -73.40** -43.71 -45.28* 
 (-2.9) (-2.1) (-3.0) (-1.8) (-2.1) 
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  





Table 9. Analysis of the change in media coverage and sentiment following the move to Nasdaq 
using the pairwise differences of the moving firms and their matches  
The table shows whether and how the moving stocks improve visibility following the switch. Panel A presents 
the regression results of the following matched pair fixed-effect difference-in-difference model: 
6
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j
Y postperiod  
=
= + +                                            (3) 
where itY  is the difference between the media coverage proxy of the moving firm and that of the matching firm 
for each matched pair of moving stock i on day t. 
i  is a matched pair-specific effect for stock pair i. We 
created six indicators for post-period windows up to 60 days after the exchange switch. For example: the first 
10-day post-period window, 
1
it
Postperiod  is set to 1 for the +1 to +10 trading days after the firm i moves and 
equal to zero otherwise for stock i and its matched stock. Dependent variables include MediaTone and 
MediaBreath. Panel B includes the t-test results for the differences in the estimated coefficients between the 
post-period 1 and those of subsequent post-periods. The t - statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
















Media Tone 0.0095*** -0.0012 0.0060* 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0054** 0.0600 
 (4.80) (-.50) (2.55) (0.56) (-.21) (2.60)  
Media Breath 0.0778 -0.0671 -0.0214 0.0214 0.0662 0.1758* 0.0800 
 (1.01) (-.96) (-.26) (0.26) (0.83) (2.34)  
Panel B: Pairwise comparison of post-period dummy coefficients for visibility proxies 
Dependent Variable 
Post-period 1 - 
Post-period 2 
Post-period 1 - 
Post-period 3 
Post-period 1 - 
Post-period 4 
Post-period 1 - 
Post-period 5 
Post-period 1 - 
Post-period 6 
Media Tone 0.0107*** 0.0035 0.0083** 0.0100*** 0.0041 
 (3.81) (1.21) (3.00) (3.64) (1.53) 
Media Breath 0.1449 0.0992 0.0564 0.0116 -0.0980 
 (1.50) (0.95) (0.54) (0.11) (-.99) 
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  





Table 10. Multivariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads, price impact and trading 
volume for the moving firms and their matches: long-term effects (Nasdaq to NYSE movement) 
The table reports the results of the regression of the following fixed effect model: 
 
,
it i it it it
Y D X   = + + +                                                   (1) 
 
where is various market quality proxies and trading activity for the moving firm less the measured quantity 
of the same proxy for its matched company. 𝛼𝑖 is a matched pair fixed effect for matched pair stock i.  is an 
indicator variable set equal to zero before the movement and equal to one after movement for stock and its 
matched stock on day . is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched 
stocks for the following control variables: daily volume (DDVol), market capitalization (MarketCap), price 
volatility (Volatility), and the daily volume-weighted average share price (VWAP). Dependent variables include 
the dollar effective spread, relative effective spread, dollar realized spread, relative realized spread, price impact 
of trades, relative price impact of trades and daily trading volume. The date of the move from Nasdaq to NYSE 
is categorized as trading day 0. The pre-period is from trading day −60 to trading day −1. The post-period is 
from trading day +1 to trading day +60. All of these components of spreads are scaled by trade value. The 
absolute measure of spreads and price impact are multiplied by 104 for presentation purposes. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables D DDVol VWAP Volatility MarketCap 
Adj R-
Square 
Dollar Effective Spread -200.92*** -0.03 20.72*** 7,365.83*** 0.05 0.21 
 ( -11) (-.94) (4.60) (11.6) (0.87)  
Relative Effective Spread -10.93*** -0.00 -0.51*** 486.96*** 0.00 0.20 
 ( -12) (-.57) (-7.1) (7.07) (0.09)  
Dollar Realized Spread -229.84*** 0.02 49.12*** 18,565.26*** 0.15* 0.38 
 ( -11) (0.35) (10.1) (17.9) (2.52)  
Relative Realized Spread -14.04*** 0.00 -0.54*** 1,097.99*** 0.00 0.30 
 ( -13) (0.35) (-6.8) (7.76) (1.22)  
Price Impact 83.15*** -0.06* -26.86*** -10,035.53*** -0.12** 0.33 
 (5.71) (-2.1) ( -11) ( -11) (-3.2)  
Relative Price Impact 5.10*** -0.00 0.07 -619.81*** -0.00 0.23 
 (7.53) (-1.3) (1.59) (-7.2) (-1.8)  
Daily Trading Volume -31.41***  1.39* 1,364.68*** -0.57** 0.44 
 (-7.3)  (2.06) (6.59) (-3.0)  
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  








Table 11. Multivariate analysis of the pairwise difference in spreads, price impact and trading 
volume for the moving and matched companies: short-term effects (Nasdaq to NYSE movement) 
The table reports the results of the regression of the following fixed-effect model: 
 
,
it i it it it
Y D X   = + + +                                                      (1) 
 
where is various market quality proxies and trading activity for the moving firm less the measured quantity 
of the same proxy for its matched company. 𝛼𝑖 is a matched pair fixed effect for matched pair stock i.  is an 
indicator variable set equal to zero before the movement and equal to one after movement for stock and its 
matched stock on day t. is a set of pairwise differences between the moving stocks and their matched stocks 
for the following control variables: daily volume (DDVol), market capitalization (MarketCap), price volatility 
(Volatility), and the daily volume-weighted average share price (VWAP). Dependent variables include the dollar 
effective spread, relative effective spread, dollar realized spread, relative realized spread, price impact of trades, 
relative price impact of trades and daily trading volume. The date of the move from Nasdaq to NYSE is 
categorized as trading day 0. The sample period is from trading day −5 to +10. All of these components of 
spreads are scaled by trade value. The absolute measure of spreads and price impact are multiplied by 104 for 
presentation purposes. The t - statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables D DDVol VWAP Volatility MarketCap 
Adj R-
Square 
Dollar Effective Spread -438.83*** -0.06 44.52 11,105.99*** -0.07 0.27 
 (-5.8) (-1.6) (1.62) (3.68) (-.84)  
Relative Effective Spread -15.27*** -0.00 -0.35 611.98*** -0.00 0.26 
 (-5.9) (-1.7) (-.48) (3.83) (-.73)  
Dollar Realized Spread -519.82*** 0.03 87.77** 21,298.74*** 0.05 0.37 
 (-6.7) (0.84) (3.10) (7.63) (0.53)  
Relative Realized Spread -17.72*** -0.00 0.06 1,103.86*** 0.00 0.41 
 (-7.5) (-.81) (0.09) (7.25) (0.10)  
Price Impact 96.44** -0.08** -40.33*** -10,573.39*** -0.12* 0.46 
 (2.76) (-3.1) (-4.1) ( -13) (-2.0)  
Relative Price Impact 2.93* -0.00* -0.30 -508.89*** -0.00 0.37 
 (1.97) (-2.3) (-1.1) ( -14) (-1.9)  
Daily Trading Volume 2.67  -5.30 1,456.74*** -1.69* 0.47 
 (0.27)  (-1.2) (6.01) (-2.2)  
* Significant at the 5% level.  
** Significant at the 1% level.  








Figure 1: Size of firms moving to Nasdaq versus NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed stocks  
This figure illustrates the mean and median market capitalization of 53 firms moving to Nasdaq in comparison 
with all NYSE-listed and all Nasdaq-listed companies over the 2000–2015 period. For each stock, we calculate 
the time-series average market capitalization over the 15-year period and then estimate cross-sectional means 
and medians for each of three samples: a sample of 53 firms, a sample of all NYSE-listed stocks and a sample of 







Figure 2. Effect of the stock exchange switch on trading volume 
This figure shows the effect of the stock exchange switch on trading activity. On the y-axis, the graph plots the 
coefficient estimates from regressing trading volume on matched pair fixed effects and dummy variables 
indicating the day relative to the switch. We create six 10-day dummies indicating up to 60 days after the 
movement. The last variable is set to one for the +1 to +10 trading days after the firm moves, and equal to zero 
otherwise for the stock and its matched stock. The x-axis shows the time relative to the switch. The dashed lines 
correspond to the 90% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates. Confidence intervals are calculated 
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Figure 3. Effect of the stock exchange switch on liquidity  
This figure shows the effect of the stock exchange switch on relative effective spreads (Graph A) and relative 
realized spread (Graph B). On the y-axis, the graph plots the coefficient estimates from regressing the liquidity 
proxies on matched pair fixed effects and dummy variables indicating the day relative to the switch. We create 
six 10-day dummies indicating up to 60 days after the movement. The last variable is set to one for the +1 to 
+10 trading days after the firm moves, and equal to zero otherwise for the stock and its matched stock. The x-
axis shows the time relative to the switch. The dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence intervals of the 
coefficient estimates. Confidence intervals are calculated from standard errors clustered by date. 
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Table A.1. Matching statistics for the firms moving from Nasdaq to NYSE and their matches 
 
The table presents a comparison of the 196 firms moving from Nasdaq to NYSE with 196 matched firms during the period of January 2000 – December 2015 using without-
replacement matching methods. A distance metric is calculated as the sum of absolute percentage deviation between the non-moving matched candidate and the moving stock 
in market capitalization and price as of the beginning of the investigated period. The match is the closest non-moving match candidate to the moving stock in terms of the 
distance metric. We report the mean and median for the moving and matched firms, and provide p-values for the differences between moving and matched firms.  
 
 Means Statistics Medians Statistics 
 Match Moving Difference t 
p-value 
(t-test) Match Moving Difference z 
p-value 
(Wilcoxon) 
Market Capitalization ($ thousands) 2,977,970 2,517,840 -460,130 -0.31 0.76 769,856 765,196 -4,660 0.03 0.98 
Stock Price 26.02 26.03 0.015 0.01 0.99 23.18 23.14 -0.04 -0.08 0.94 





Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for companies moving from Nasdaq to NYSE and their matches over the period of January 2000–December 2015 
 
The table reports the summary statistics for the firms switching the listing exchange during the period of January 2000–December 2015 and its matched stocks. For each 
stock, we calculate the time-series average over the investigated period and then estimate cross-sectional means for each proxy. Values are provided in US dollar amounts ($) 
or in basis points (bp). 
 
 Firms NASDAQ to NYSE Matching Firms NASDAQ to NYSE 
Variables #Firms Min Max Mean Std #Firms Min Max Mean Std 
Number of trades 196 3 8,912 933 1,348 196 32 12,647 1,275 1,808 
Daily Trading Volume (shares) 196 1,347 23,127,664 813,651 2,343,263 196 8,709 51,369,184 1,277,691 4,424,166 
Daily Trading Value ($ million) 196 0.04 752.1 20.3 62.9 196 0.17 1,698.7 31.9 130.6 
Effective Spread ($) 196 107.8 5205.9 755 652.9 196 84.1 6890.8 908.4 857.9 
Relative Effective Spread (bp) 196 3.6 324.9 35 32.7 196 3.6 278.4 44.2 40.4 
Realized Spread ($) 196 199.9 5346.4 1301 820.2 196 151.1 11320.8 1575.5 1259.8 
Relative Realized Spread (bp) 196 15.9 451.9 55.7 36.5 196 13.9 285.1 70.8 43.9 
Price Impact ($) 196 -3405.7 467.6 -563.2 508.9 196 -5745.6 30.2 -706 686.7 
Relative Price Impact (bp) 196 -136.9 19.7 -22.6 14.9 196 -74.1 11 -29.5 16.1 
Average Price 196 4.5 120.8 26.1 16.4 196 1.7 132.7 25.6 17.2 
Relative Range-Based Volatility 196 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.01 196 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 
Market Capitalization ($ billion) 196 0.09 152.5 2.6 11.3 196 0.01 277.7 3.2 20.1 
 
 
